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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4205 
___________ 
 
ZACHARY SPADA, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DR. EDGAR ALFREDO MARTINEZ, M.D. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-13-cv-00113) 
Magistrate Judge: Honorable Keith A. Pesto (by consent) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 12, 2014 
Before:  CHAGARES, KRAUSE and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 18, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Zachary Spada, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the order of 
the Magistrate Judge, proceeding by consent, that denied his motion to alter or amend an 
order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil action for failure to state a claim.  For the 
foregoing reasons, we will vacate and remand for further proceedings. 
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I. 
 In his complaint, Spada claimed that while he was confined in the Mental Health 
Unit (“MHU”) at State Correctional Institute – Graterford (“SCI-Graterford”), Dr. Edgar 
Alfredo Martinez, who was in charge of Spada’s medical care, ignored his dystonic 
reaction to medication, which resulted in damage to his teeth.  This incident occurred 
around December 2011 and January 2012.  Spada alleged that SCI-Graterford staff 
refused to provide him with grievance forms.   
 In February 2012, Spada was transferred to State Correctional Institute – 
Houtzdale (“SCI-Houtzdale”).  On May 14, 2013, Spada submitted a grievance form to 
the Facility Grievance Coordinator at SCI-Houtzdale.  Spada wrote on the grievance 
form: “On or about December 2011- January 2012 I was denied proper medical care at 
SCI-Graterford.  They denied me Cogentin while I was having an Acute Distonic [sic] 
Reaction to IM Haldol.  It damaged my teeth and I want them fixed.”  Def. Mot. to 
Dismiss, Ex. A, p.2 of 8 (ECF No. 19-1 Aug. 9, 2013).  The Facility Grievance 
Coordinator rejected Spada’s grievance because it did not comply with prison grievance 
procedures then in effect.  See DC-ADM 804, § I.A.14 (effective Dec. 8, 2010) 
(mandating that prisoner grievances be filed within 15 working days of the complained of 
event); DC-ADM 804, § I.A.15 (effective Dec. 8, 2010) (requiring that grievances be 
filed at the facility where the event occurred).1  Spada appealed the rejection of his 
grievance on May 20, 2013. 
                                              
1 The grievance regulations in force during the period pertinent to Spada’s claims allowed 
for waiver only in three circumstances not relevant to his case.  Those regulations have 
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 While that appeal was pending, Spada filed his original complaint in the District 
Court on June 1, 2013.  On June 12, 2013, the Superintendent at SCI-Houtzdale 
concluded that the Facility Grievance Coordinator properly rejected Spada’s grievance 
because it did not offer for review a “timely date or specific event occurring at SCI-
Houtzdale.”  Def. Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A, p.5 of 8.  Spada submitted a final appeal on 
June 27, 2013, which was denied on July 29, 2013. 
 Meanwhile, Spada filed an amended complaint on July 26, 2013.  Therein, Spada 
revised details of his allegations and described his attempts to exhaust his administrative 
remedies after his transfer to SCI-Houtzdale.  Dr. Martinez filed a motion to dismiss, 
arguing that Spada’s claims were unexhausted and procedurally defaulted.  See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  In particular, Dr. Martinez contended that Spada’s grievance was 
untimely filed, was submitted to the wrong facility, and did not name Dr. Martinez.  In 
opposition, Spada argued, inter alia, that his complaint should not be dismissed for failure 
to exhaust because SCI-Graterford staff refused to provide him with a grievance form, 
thereby rendering the grievance process unavailable.  
 The parties agreed to proceed before a Magistrate Judge, who granted Dr. 
Martinez’s motion and dismissed the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  The 
Magistrate Judge first determined that dismissal was appropriate because the complaint 
was prematurely filed.  The Magistrate Judge noted that Spada filed his complaint on 
                                                                                                                                                  
since been amended to give the Facility Grievance Coordinator full discretion to extend 
the time to file a grievance.  See DC-ADM 804, § I.B.2.a-e (effective May 1, 2014) 
(permitting a time extension for filing a grievance for enumerated reasons and “any other 
reason the Facility Grievance Coordinator deems appropriate”). 
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June 1, 2013, prior to submitting his final appeal in the grievance process on June 27, 
2013.  The Magistrate Judge determined that dismissal was also appropriate because 
Spada’s grievance lacked specificity.  On his grievance form Spada wrote only that 
“they” denied him proper medical care.  Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 
regulations mandate that inmate grievances identify the individuals involved.  DC-ADM 
804, § I.A.11 (effective Dec. 8, 2010).  Thus, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the 
omission of Dr. Martinez’s name in the grievance resulted in a procedural default.  The 
Magistrate Judge reasoned that in light of the “premature filing” and failure to identify 
Dr. Martinez in the grievance, it was unnecessary to review Spada’s argument that SCI-
Graterford staff prevented him from timely filing a grievance. 
 Spada filed a timely motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  In that motion, Spada argued that Dr. Martinez failed to establish that his 
claims were unexhausted and procedurally defaulted because he had alleged that SCI-
Graterford staff withheld grievance forms.  The Magistrate Judge found no basis to alter 
the judgment and denied Spada’s motion.  Spada timely appealed.2 
II. 
 Dr. Martinez argues that Spada was required to properly “exhaust” his 
administrative remedies despite SCI-Graterford officials withholding grievance forms 
                                              
2 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Spada’s appeal of 
the denial of his motion for reconsideration “brings up the underlying judgment for 
review.”  McAlister v. Sentry Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 550, 552-53 (3d Cir. 1992).  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint under Rule 
12(b)(6).  McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009).  We review the 
denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion.  Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 
F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
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during the 15-day filing period.  However, we conclude that the withholding of the 
grievance forms, if established, would have rendered the grievance process permanently 
unavailable to Spada under the regulations then in effect.  Therefore, we will vacate the 
Magistrate Judge’s dismissal of Spada’s complaint and remand for further proceedings. 
 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) prohibits an inmate from bringing a 
civil rights suit alleging specific acts of unconstitutional conduct by prison officials “until 
such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  
“Proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary” to satisfy the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement.  Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006); see also Spruill v. 
Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 230 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that the PLRA’s exhaustion 
requirement contains a procedural default component).  Dr. Martinez contends that the 
Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Spada’s claims were procedurally defaulted 
because he initiated his civil action prior to completion of the grievance process, see 
Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 209 & n.9 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that under the 
PLRA an inmate must exhaust available remedies prior to filing suit), and because his 
grievance failed to name Dr. Martinez, see DC ADM-804, § I.A.11 (2010).   
 However, if a prison official thwarts a prisoner’s ability to exhaust his 
administrative remedies, those remedies are not considered available within the meaning 
of § 1997e.  See Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 2002).  Spada alleged in his 
amended complaint that SCI-Graterford officials denied his request for a grievance form 
for at least 15 days after the incident occurred, causing his grievance to become time-
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barred.  See DC-ADM 804, § I.A.14 (2010); see also Spruill, 372 F.3d at 234.  The 
availability of administrative remedies is a question of law.  See Brown, 312 F.3d at 113.  
Taking as true Spada’s allegation that SCI-Graterford officials withheld grievance forms 
for the duration of the 15-day period following the incident, see McTernan, 577 F.3d at 
526, and given the regulations then in effect, we must conclude that the grievance process 
was unavailable to Spada within the meaning of § 1997e.  See, e.g., Mitchell v. Horn, 318 
F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 2003); Brown, 312 F.3d at 113. 
 The Magistrate Judge did not review whether the grievance process was available 
to Spada during the 15-day period following the incident.  Dr. Martinez argues that such 
review was not necessary because Spada’s complaint was “prematurely filed” and he 
failed to specifically identify Dr. Martinez on the grievance form.  Undeniably, Spada’s 
grievance suffers from procedural deficiencies: it was untimely, see DC-ADM 804, 
§ I.A.14 (2010); it was submitted to officials at SCI-Houtzdale despite alleging an 
incident that occurred at SCI-Graterford, see DC-ADM 804, § 1.A.15 (2010); and Dr. 
Martinez was not explicitly identified, see DC-ADM 804, § 1.A.11 (2010).  But those 
deficiencies have no bearing on whether the grievance process was available to Spada 
when he needed it to be. 
 Dr. Martinez argues that the Magistrate Judge did not need to consider whether 
SCI-Graterford officials rendered the grievance process unavailable because Spada 
eventually gained access to the grievance forms and conceivably could have properly 
exhausted his administrative remedies with the filing of his untimely grievance.  As Dr. 
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Martinez notes, “the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA is satisfied by an untimely 
filing of a grievance if it is accepted and decided on the merits by the appropriate prison 
authority.”  Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 125 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Camp v. 
Brennan, 219 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 2000).  Here, however, contrary to Dr. Martinez’s 
assertion, Spada’s 2013 grievance was neither accepted nor decided on the merits.  Cf. 
Camp, 219 F.3d at 281; see also Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(“[W]hen a state treats a filing as timely and resolves it on the merits, the federal 
judiciary will not second-guess that action, for the grievance has served its function of 
alerting the state and inviting corrective action.”). 
 Dr. Martinez also contends that even if the grievance process was unavailable 
during the 15-day filing period, Spada was required to exhaust his administrative 
remedies once he had access to grievance forms.  But Dr. Martinez has provided no basis 
for concluding that Spada’s untimely grievance would have been accepted and resolved 
on the merits.  Notably, there was no requirement that Spada utilize the grievance process 
after the 15-day period expired, which is the foundation of Dr. Martinez’s position.  See, 
e.g., Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 273 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that an 
administrative remedy was made unavailable after correctional officers did not respond to 
a grievance and there was no regulation addressing such a situation).  To be sure, some 
courts have held that in certain circumstances a prisoner is required to attempt exhaustion 
of a grievance even when that attempt would be untimely.  See Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 
1368, 1378-79 (11th Cir. 2008).  However, in those cases a prisoner is generally required 
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to submit a grievance that would otherwise be untimely only if the time limits may be 
waived.  See, e.g., id. (holding that a prisoner failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies when he did not utilize grievance procedures that permitted waiver of the time 
limit for “good cause”).  In Pennsylvania, however, the grievance regulations that were in 
effect during the relevant period permitted an extension of the time limit only if “the 
reason for the delay in filing” was caused by temporary or permanent transfers, an 
“Authorized Temporary Absence,” or mail-related delays.  DC-ADM 804, § I.B.3.a-d 
(effective Dec. 8, 2010).  Those grievance regulations, in other words, included no 
provision allowing for a discretionary waiver of the 15-day time limit for good cause 
shown, for example, the prison staff’s withholding of grievance forms.3  Consequently, 
Spada did not have to file an untimely grievance prior to proceeding with a civil 
complaint.  See, e.g., Brown, 312 F.3d at 111-12. 
 Spada was not required to engage a process that was unavailable to him, see id. at 
111-13, and his later attempt to unsuccessfully use that process does not bar him from 
bringing suit.  Denying Spada federal review of his complaint for failure to exhaust under 
these circumstances would not further the purpose of the PLRA’s exhaustion 
requirement, which is to “allow[] prison officials an opportunity to resolve disputes 
concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into court.”  Jones v. 
                                              
3 The fact that a discretionary waiver of the 15-day time limit was unavailable to Spada 
under the now-superseded regulations is integral to our conclusion that he was not 
required to file an untimely grievance.  We offer no opinion as to whether, under the 
current regulations, a prisoner who initially was denied a grievance form, and therefore 
was unable to file timely, is required to file an untimely grievance, seek a discretionary 
extension, and exhaust administrative remedies.  Cf. Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1378-79. 
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Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007).  In sum, a factual question exists concerning whether 
SCI-Graterford officials refused to provide Spada with grievance forms, thereby 
rendering the grievance process unavailable to him within the meaning of § 1997e.  Thus, 
the Magistrate Judge erred in dismissing his complaint. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the October 9, 2013 and October 16, 
2013 orders of the Magistrate Judge sitting by consent and remand for further 
proceedings.  Spada’s motion to suppress a copy of his original complaint is denied 
because that complaint is part of the District Court record. 
